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Fault and Attack Management in All-Optical 
Networks 
R. Rejeb, M. S. Leeson, and R. J. Green, University of Warwick, UK
  
Abstract— Network management for optical networks faces 
additional security challenges that arise by using transparent 
optical network components in communication systems. Whilst 
some of available management mechanisms are applicable to 
different types of network architectures, many of these are not 
adequate for all-optical networks. These have unique features 
and requirements in terms of security and quality of service thus 
requiring a much more targeted approach in terms of network 
management. In this paper we consider management issues with 
particular emphasis on complications that arise due to the unique 
characteristics and peculiar behaviors of transparent network 
components. In particular, signal quality monitoring is still a 
major complication in all-optical networks. Despite new methods 
for detection and localization of attacks having been proposed, no 
robust standards or techniques exist to date for guaranteeing the 
quality of service in these networks. Therefore, the need for more 
sophisticated mechanisms that assist managing and assessing the 
proper function of transparent network components is highly 
desirable. Accordingly, we present an algorithm for multiple 
attack localization and identification that can participate in some 
tasks for fault management of all-optical networks. 
 
Index Terms—All-Optical Networks, Fault Management, 
Optical crosstalk, Optical Network Security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ETWORK management is an indispensable constituent 
of communication systems since it is responsible for 
ensuring the secure and continuous functioning of any 
network. Specifically, a network management implementation 
should be capable of handling the configuration, fault, 
performance, security, and accounting in the network. Whilst 
some of available management mechanisms are applicable to 
different types of network architectures, many of these are not 
adequate for All-Optical Networks (AONs). These contain 
only transparent optical components and therefore differ to a 
large extent from the optical networks currently used. As a 
result, AONs have unique features and requirements in terms 
of security and Quality of Service (QoS) that require a very 
targeted approach in terms of network management. Although 
the job of network management for AONs is essentially no 
different from that of managing traditional optical networks, 
numerous management issues arise, in particular because of 
network transparency and the characteristics of AON 
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components. These specific features thus require more 
sophisticated techniques and methods for managing and 
monitoring the network, controlled with an appropriate 
Network Management System (NMS) that can meet and 
satisfy the challenges posed by AONs [1]. 
In this paper we consider management issues that arise by 
using AON components in communication systems. First, we 
provide a brief overview of faults and attacks that may occur 
in AONs. Next, we focus on management issues with 
particular emphasis on complications that arise due to the 
unique characteristics and peculiar behaviors of various AON 
components. Then, we present the key concepts of an 
algorithm for multiple attack localization and identification 
that can be used in some tasks for fault management of AONs.  
II. FAULTS AND ATTACKS IN AONS 
AONs offer the promise of increased capacity, flexibility, 
and scalability, compared to the optical networks currently in 
use. In particular, they provide transparency capabilities and 
new features, allowing routing and switching of traffic 
without any examination or modification of signals within the 
network. Although transparency offers many advantages for 
high data rate communications, it brings forth a set of new 
challenges in terms of network security, which do not exist in 
traditional networks [2]. One of the serious problems with 
network transparency is that the properties of transparent 
optical components make AONs particularly vulnerable to 
various forms of service disruption, QoS degradation, and 
eavesdropping attacks. A problem that comes up in this regard 
is that network transparency may introduce significant 
miscellaneous transmission impairments, which range from 
simple attenuation to complex non-linear effects and 
polarization dependent losses. This raises the danger that 
those impairments will aggregate and become significant as 
the signal traverses successive nodes, imposing component-
crosstalk constraints that tighten rapidly as the network grows 
in size. Another problem related to transparency is that 
accumulated transmission impairments and service disruption 
attacks spread rapidly through the network. Specifically, if the 
traffic itself is the cause of the failure, multiple failures will be 
caused throughout the network and propagate quickly without 
any restoration. In this case, the extremely high data rates in 
AONs ensure that, even if the network were under attack for a 
few seconds, large amounts of data to be lost or compromised. 
This in particular makes detection and identification of attacks 
a crucial task for fault management, since these attacks can be 
N
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launched elsewhere in the network eluding most available 
monitoring techniques. These methods are in general not 
sensitive enough to detect small and sporadic bit error rate 
(BER) degradations [2]. Carefully addressing these issues 
requires, therefore, a comprehensive understanding of the 
unique characteristics of AON components that make possible 
the distinguishing of attacks from conventional failures. 
A. Type of Attacks in AONs 
Security attacks upon AONs may range from a simple 
physical access to more complex attacks exploiting: a) the 
peculiar behaviours of optical fibers, b) the unique 
characteristics of AON components, and c) the shortcomings 
of available supervisory techniques [3]. However, attacks can 
be considered from different viewpoints. From an attacker’s 
perspective, attacks can be broadly categorized into six areas: 
traffic analysis, eavesdropping, data delay, service denial, 
QoS degradation, and spoofing [2]. Since some of these areas 
may have similar characteristics, attacks can be broadly 
grouped into two main categories, namely service disruption 
and eavesdropping, which may be achieved by gaining access 
to the network through authorized or unauthorized entry 
points. However, to realize a disruption attack, an attacker that 
can gain access to the network may implement, for example, 
an in-band or out-band jamming attack method. To implement 
the former method, the attacker can take advantage of the 
unique characteristics of AON components such as the gain 
saturation of optical amplifiers. The attacker can gradually 
increase the power of one channel with respect to the other 
copropagating channels at the input of an optical amplifier so 
that the output of some channels may be too low or too high. 
As a consequence of not having adequate measures to detect 
and report on its abnormal power intensity, the attacking 
signal will propagate through the network as if it were a 
legitimate user, and significantly deprive other legal channels 
of their gains along its route. In particular when the attacking 
signal gets strong enough, the affected channels may suffer 
from performance degradation that produces a complete loss 
of service. Similarly, to implement an out-of-band jamming 
attack, the attacker may insert power at a wavelength outside 
the signal window and cause thereby transmission effects such 
as the Raman effect1 to degrade the signal quality of 
copropagating channels. Unlike performing an eavesdropping 
attack, which can be achieved by an unauthorized observation 
method, the attacker attempts to gain information from 
adjacent signals making use of crosstalk leaking from shared 
network resources. 
From a management perspective, security failures and 
attacks upon AONs may be also considered based on their 
specific characteristics and attributes such as the attack 
methods used, attack access points as well as the AON 
components and transmission segments targeted. Attacks can 
be broadly classified into two main types namely direct 
attacks and indirect attacks [4]. The former are more related 
to physical network components and can be directly 
implemented on different AON components such as taps and 
optical fibers. In contrast, the latter are unlikely to be 
performed directly or their entry points are not easily 
accessible to potential attackers. In this case, an attacker 
attempts to use indirect means, taking advantage of possible 
vulnerabilities of AON components and other transmission 
effects (for example crosstalk effects) to gain access to the 
network. In comparison to direct attacks, which are in general 
easier to detect and rectify, indirect attacks require expert 
diagnostic techniques and more sophisticated management 
mechanisms to ensure the secure and proper function of the 
network. However, either type of these attacks may be 
targeted at three major AON components, namely optical fiber 
cables, optical amplifiers, and switching nodes. As illustrated 
in Figure 1 (a), these components can be modeled as a 
sequence of interrelated management sections [4]. A typical 
transmission segment may be divided in three sections: Fiber 
Section (S
(a)
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Figure 1. Management sections. (a) Sequence of management sections along
an optical link segment. (b) Management sections into an OXC node. 
 
1 Raman effect or stimulated Raman scattering is one of the non-linear 
effects that can be used to degrade the quality of optical signals.  
F), Gain Section (SG), and Cross-Connect (OXC) 
Section (SX). As illustrated in Figure 1 (b), the management 
section SX can be in turn subdivided into three additional 
sections namely Demultiplexer Section (SD), Switching 
Section (SS), and Multiplexer Section (SM). Table I 
summarizes the common known types of attacks that may be 
practiced upon these management sections.  
To illustrate how attacks interact with each other as they 
propagate through the network, we now consider an attack 
scenario that may occur along a typical transmission segment. 
Figure 2 shows a sample OXC node with two input and output 
fibers supporting two wavelength channels. An attacker that 
T
ATTACK TYPES 
Attack type Attack metho
In-band jamm
Out-band jam
Intentional cr
Service 
Disruption 
Gain competi
Eavesdropping UnauthorizedABLE I 
AND METHODS IN AONS. 
d Component Section 
ing power Fiber SF
ming power Fiber SF
Splitter SD
Filter SD
Switch SS
osstalk 
Combiner SM
tion Amplifier SG
Fiber SF observation 
Tap SF
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can gain access to the network as shown in Figure 2 (a), is 
then able to perform a service disruptive attack by injecting a 
strong optical signal at wavelength , which is already in 
use. This causes an increase of the optical power at that 
wavelength and can thus impact other legitimate channels that 
copropagate at the same time. When traversing the optical 
amplifier (gain section S
2λ
G), shown in Figure 2 (b), channel  
robs channel  of power and propagates downstream through 
successive AON components, affecting other legal channels 
along its route. This type of attack is known as a gain 
competition attack. Further, the demultiplexers, Figure 2 (c) 
and (g), ideally separate incoming wavelengths to 
corresponding switches. The nonideal crosstalk specification 
of the optical demultiplexer means that a small portion of the 
signal at channel  leaks into the adjacent channel  and 
vice versa. When passing through the optical switches (section 
S
2λ
1λ
1λ 2λ
S), Figure 2 (d) and (h), channels with the same wavelength 
interfere with each other. This causes crosstalk arising from 
the nonideal isolation of one switch port from the other. As 
shown in Figure 2 (e) and (i), when the channels are combined 
again by the multiplexer, a small portion of  that leaked into 
 will also leak back into the common output fiber. This also 
causes crosstalk, which accumulates from several AON 
components as the signals propagate downstream through 
many intermediate AON nodes in the network. According to 
whether it has the same nominal wavelength as an affected 
signal or not, crosstalk can be categorized in two forms, 
namely interchannel crosstalk and intrachannel crosstalk [5]. 
The former arises between adjacent signals at different 
wavelengths, whilst the latter occurs between signals at the 
same nominal wavelength. Both forms of crosstalk can arise 
from a variety of sources. Compared to interchannel crosstalk, 
intrachannel crosstalk effects are of prime importance for 
AONs because they can lead to severe power penalties and 
cannot be eliminated by the optical filters or demultiplexers. 
Intrachannel crosstalk thus imposes an important limitation on 
practical implementation of AONs. 
1λ
2λ
B. Failures versus Attacks 
Conventional component failures in AONs usually occur 
because of malfunctions or breakdowns of AON devices and 
components. Examples include optical fiber cuts, loss of light, 
lightpath failures, and fuse or power circuit disruptions. 
Although AON components have fairly long mean-time-
between-failures (typically several years), they may fail due to 
the physical natural fatigue and ageing of component 
constituents [6]. Another source of failure arises from 
bandwidth narrowing due to the cascading of filters, and 
wavelength misalignment between multiplexers and 
demultiplexers. Failures in optical amplifiers occur from a 
variety of sources such as loss of light or failing of passive 
components within the amplifier. However, these failures are 
in general easier to detect and rectify using standard localizing 
metrology as means for monitoring, detecting, and isolation 
methods. Upon detection, these failures are immediately 
communicated as single alarms to the NMS that will establish 
appropriate protection and restoration reactions in accordance 
with the facts. 
 In contrast, security attacks differ substantially from 
conventional failures and should be therefore treated 
differently. This is because attacks appear and disappear 
sporadically and can be launched elsewhere in the network. In 
particular, the attacker may thwart simple detection methods, 
which are in general not sensitive enough to detect small and 
sporadic performance degradations. Furthermore a disruptive 
attack, which is erroneously identified as a component failure, 
can spread rapidly through the network causing additional 
failures and triggering multiple alarms. Consequently, 
rerouting of traffic cannot solve all resulting failures and 
problems, as is the case of component failures. Table II 
provides a comparison of conventional failures versus 
disruption attacks that may be practiced upon AONs. 
(a)
F1(λ1, λ2)
Switch
λ1
Switch
λ2
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(d)
F2(λ1, λ2)
Leakage λ2
(c)
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Coherent XT
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A(λ2)
Figure 2. An attack propagation scenario. The attack propagates through a 
link segment passing through an optical amplifier, wavelength demultiplexer, 
optical space switch, and wavelength demultiplexer. 
III. AVAILABLE SUPERVISORY AND MONITORING METHODS 
Fault management functions may be broadly classified into 
three categories: (a) prevention; (b) detection; (c) reaction. 
Fault detection deals with detecting and isolating failures 
when they occur, and also includes alarm generation. Fault 
protection and restoration refers to the processes used to guard 
against failed conditions and to restore network services in the 
event of transmission failures. In protecting optical networks, 
T
COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL FAIL
Characteristics Failures 
Behaviors 
- occur slower than attacks due to physical natu
ageing of optical devises and components. 
- occur once and remain disabled until they are
- do not disturb the operation of several device
- lead to single alarms. 
Identification and 
detection methods 
- rely on identifying the domain of raised alarm
failures using algorithms and statistical metho
likelihood of certain failures having occurred
Restoration schemes - rerouting of traffic channels can solve all resu
Occurrence sections - usually within optical devices and componentABLE II 
URES VERSUS DISRUPTION ATTACKS IN AONS. 
Attacks 
ral fatigue and 
 repaired again. 
s at the same time. 
- appear and disappear often sporadically in the network. 
- spread rapidly through the network without restoration. 
- elude most of available supervisory techniques. 
- cause additional failures and problems in the network. 
- trigger multiple erroneous and undesirable alarms. 
 and correlating the 
ds to determine the 
. 
- used methods vary from simple to more complex. 
- using diagnostic, electronic and photonic methods. 
lting problems. - rerouting of traffic cannot solve all resulting problems. 
s. - can launch elsewhere in the network. 
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supervisory techniques are required, enabling the detection 
failures, and these may currently be grouped into tw
categories [2]. The first is based on methods that perfor
statistical analysis of the transmitted data: power detectio
optical spectral analyzers and BER testers. The second reli
on the use of probe signals devoted to diagnostic purpose
pilot tones and optical time domain reflectometers. Howeve
most of these supervisory techniques are insufficient to dete
small and sporadic BER degradations, failing to detect i
band and out-of-band jamming attacks. Even the use of pro
signals is not sensitive enough to detect BER degradations.  
Recent proposals to overcome the difficulty of determinin
the continuity and quality of optical signals include err
detecting codes, sampling and spectral methods. Howev
most of these methods are too difficult to implement in eve
AON component or require the access to the electric
domain. Table III summarizes fault detection capabilities 
available monitoring methods. Regarding cost, complexit
and implementation plausibility, these methods may be list
in decreasing order of difficulty and also decreasin
information content as follows [3]: 
1. BER estimation with access to digital signal – BE
measurement methods. 
2. BER estimation with access to optical signal – Samplin
methods (Eye monitoring). 
3. Power and noise monitoring - optical signal-to-noise rati
4. Indirect methods – are methods that do not directly sen
the signal shape or power but still indicate the prop
function of network components. 
The conclusion is that the problems rising from physic
security in AONs and the means of protecting against the
cannot be tackled using current available supervisory an
monitoring techniques. Despite new methods for detection an
localization of security attacks having been proposed, n
robust standards or techniques exist to date for guaranteein
the quality of service in AONs.  
IV. MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Following from the previous sections, it is clear th
network management for AONs faces additional challeng
and still unsolved problems. One of the main premises 
AONs is the establishment of a robust and flexible optic
control plane for managing network resources, provisionin
and maintaining network connections across multiple contr
domains. Such a control plane must have the ability to sele
FAILURE DETECTION CAPABILITIES OF AV
Supervisory and Monitoring Techniques Signal Domain In-Ban
BER measurements Digital 
Sampling methods Optical 
Optical Power Meters Optical 
BER Testers Optical 
Optical Spectral Analyzers Optical 
Pilot tones Optical 
Optical Time Domain Reflectometers Optical 
Optical Frequency Domain Reflectometers Optical 
 TABLE III 
AILABLE SUPERVISORY AND MONITORING METHODS 
d Jamming Out-Band Jamming Time Distortion Noise Accuracy 
Yes Yes Yes Yes High 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Medium 
No No No No Low 
No No No No Low 
No Yes No No Low 
No No No No Low 
No No No No Low of 
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er 
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se 
er 
al 
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o 
g 
at 
es 
of 
al 
g 
ol 
ct 
lightpaths2 for requested end-to-end connections, assign 
wavelengths to these lightpaths, and configure the appropriate 
optical resources in the network. Furthermore, it should be 
able to provide updates for link state information to reflect 
which wavelengths are currently being used on which fiber 
links so that routers and switches may make informed routing 
decisions. An important issue that arises in this regard is how 
to address the trade-off between service quality and resource 
utilization. Addressing this issue requires different scheduling 
and sharing mechanisms to maximize resource utilization 
while ensuring adequate QoS guarantees. One possible 
solution is the aggregation of traffic flows to maximize the 
optical throughput and to reduce operational and capital costs. 
Another related issue arises from the fact that the 
implementation of a control plane requires information 
exchange between control and management entities that are 
involved in the control process. To achieve this, fast signaling 
channels need to be in place between switching and routing 
nodes. These channels might be used to exchange up-to-date 
control information that is needed for managing all supported 
connections and performing other control functions. In 
general, control channels can be realized in different ways; 
one might be implemented in-band while another may be 
implemented out-of-band. There are, however, compelling 
reasons for decoupling control channels from their associated 
data links. An important reason for this is that data traffic 
carried in the optical domain is transparently switched to 
increase the efficiency of the network and there is thus no 
need for switching nodes to have any understanding of the 
protocol stacks used for handling the control information. 
Another reason is that there may not be any active channels 
available while the data links are still in use, for example 
when bringing one or more control channels down gracefully 
for maintenance purposes. From a management point of view, 
it is unacceptable to tear down a data traffic link, simply 
because the control channel is no longer available. Moreover, 
between a pair of switching nodes there may be multiple data 
links and it is therefore more efficient to manage these as a 
bundle using a single separated out-of-band control channel. 
In recent years, the notion of an optical control plane has 
received extensive attention and has rapidly developed to a 
detailed set of protocol standards, currently being standardized 
by the International Telecommunication Union-
Yes Yes No No Medium 
 
2 A lightpath is defined as an end-to-end optical connection between a 
source and a destination transparent node. 
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Telecommunication Standardization Sector and others [7]. 
Nevertheless, several additional issues in terms of security and 
network management are still unsolved [1]-[4]. One of the 
main management issues revolves around the fact that very 
little is currently understood concerning performance 
monitoring in AONs. For example, when discussing routing in 
AONs, it is usually assumed that all routes have adequate 
signal quality (ensured by limiting AONs to sub-networks of 
limited size). This approach is very practical and has been 
applied to date when determining the maximum length of 
optical links and spans, for example. In addition, operational 
considerations such as failure isolation also make limiting the 
size of domains of transparency very attractive. 
Performance management is still a major complication in 
AONs, since optical performance measurements, which are 
typically limited to optical power, Optical Signal-to-Noise 
Ratio (OSNR), and wavelength registration, do not directly 
relate to QoS measures used by carriers. These are concerned 
with attributes related to the lightpath, such as BER and parity 
checks, of which the management system may have no prior 
knowledge. Moreover, transparency means that it is not 
possible to access overhead bits in the transmitted data to 
obtain performance-related measures, adding further 
complexity to the detection of service disruption. Unless 
information concerning the type of signal that is being carried 
on a lightpath is conveyed to the NMS, it will not be able to 
ascertain whether the measured power levels and OSNR fall 
within the preset acceptable limits.  
Fault management is further complicated since detection 
functions, which should be handled at the ISO layer closest to 
the failure, are delegated to the physical layer instead of 
higher layers. That is, fault detection and localization methods 
are less insulated from details of physical layer than of higher 
layers, requiring the availability of expert diagnostic 
techniques to measure and control the smallest granular 
component, the wavelength channel. Moreover, security 
failure identification of both the location and type of attacks 
differs significantly from that in traditional networks, which 
basically relies on identifying the domain of an alarm and 
using algorithms to determine the probability of a certain 
failure having occurred. Although the same techniques can be 
applied to AONs, several issues exist and need to be 
addressed carefully [1]-[4].  
V. ATTACK LOCALIZATION AND IDENTIFICATION ALGORITHM 
This section presents an outline of the Multiple Attack 
Localization and Identification (MALI) algorithm [5] that can 
participate in some tasks for fault management of AONs. The 
main task of the MALI algorithm is to correlate multiple 
security failures and attacks locally at any AON node and to 
discover their tracks through the network. The MALI 
algorithm is distributed and relies on a reliable management 
system such as the Link Management Protocol [8], since its 
overall success depends upon correct message passing and 
processing at the local nodes.  
The key concepts of the MALI algorithm are based on the 
OXC node model proposed in [5]. This model defines an 
OXC node as a 7-tuple ( )µχ ,,,,,, MSDWFOXC = , where 
F , W , , , and D S M  are nonempty component sets of fiber 
ports, supported wavelengths, wavelength demultiplexers, 
optical switches, and wavelength multiplexers, respectively. 
The main key functions of the OXC node model are 
represented by χ  and µ . These are responsible for updating 
the connection and monitoring information of all established 
lightpaths that copropagate through the OXC node 
simultaneously. The model denotes the numbers of fiber ports 
and supported wavelengths by n  and m , respectively. To 
identify the source and nature of detected performance 
degradation, the algorithm makes particular use of up-to-date 
connection and monitoring information of any established 
lightpath, on the input and output side of each node in the 
network. The required monitoring information and 
measurements can be correlated at local nodes or acquired 
from remote monitoring nodes [9].  
The MALI algorithm mainly runs a generic localization 
procedure, which will be initiated at the downstream node that 
first detects serious performance degradation at an arbitrary 
lightpath on its output side. 
A downstream node, which first notices serious 
performance degradation at a disturbed lightpath, raises an 
alarm, indicating that a failure is detected on its output side. 
Next, it computes the required channel state information on its 
input side. Then, it determines the set of lightpaths that share 
the same output fiber with the disturbed lightpath. For each of 
these, it determines the set of lightpaths that pass through the 
same optical switch at the same time. Hence, it delegates the 
localization process to next upstream node when the status of 
a lightpath channel is nonzero on the input side of the node. 
Otherwise, it terminates the localization process for this 
lightpath and notifies the NMS that the disturbed lightpath is 
most likely to be affected in the current node. 
An upstream node that receives the localization process 
with a disturbed lightpath starts the localization procedure 
from scratch and repeats all steps when the channel status of 
the disturbed lightpath is nonzero on the output side of the 
node. Otherwise, it terminates the localization process and 
notifies the NMS indicating that the failure is most likely to be 
at the optical fiber link interconnecting both upstream and 
downstream nodes.  
The localization procedure provides to the NMS 
information about locations of possible failures and attacks. 
The information can be included as part of the failure 
notifications. Once the origins of the detected failures have 
been localized, the NMS can then make an accurate decision 
(for example, which offender lightpaths should be 
disconnected or rerouted) to achieve finer grained recovery 
switching actions. However, the whole localization process 
can be solved in a linear time depending on the distribution of 
upstream nodes involved in the process [10]. 
Figure 3 shows an attack propagation scenario, where 
several OXC nodes are interconnected by optical fiber links. 
Each node consists of 2 fiber ports, 2 demultiplexer and 
multiplexer pairs, and 2 optical space switches. Seven 
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lightpaths,  to , propagate through the network 
simultaneously. Performing the MALI algorithm leads to the 
following results: The detected performance degradation at 
node  stems from two different sources and the offender 
lightpaths in this case are  and . Lightpath  is directly 
affected by a power jamming attack , which causes an 
increase of the optical power at that lightpath, and thus 
impacts copropagating lightpath  as they pass through node 
. When traversing the optical amplifier (node ), 
lightpath  robs lightpath  of power (gain competition 
attack) and propagates downstream through successive 
transparent optical components, affecting other legal 
lightpaths along its route. On the other hand, lightpath , 
which is disturbed by a malicious attack , affects 
copropagating lightpath  as they pass through node  at 
the same time. When passing through node , lightpath , 
in turn, affects its neighboring lightpath . However, 
lightpath , on which serious performance degradation is 
detected, is innocent and should not be disconnected. Since 
 is a power jamming attack on the optical link , 
the NMS may reroute lightpath  thereby avoiding node 
. Lightpath , which added in node , should be 
immediately disconnected until attack  is thoroughly 
isolated. 
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A: Attack source
N: All-Optical Node
G: Gain competition
Crosstalk path
Localization path
x Crosstalk source
Localization terminated
OXC
OXC
x)( 12 λA
Client
x
Figure 3: An attack propagation scenario. The sample network consists of 7 OXC nodes interconnected with each other by optical fiber links. Each node
consists of 2 incoming/outgoing fiber pairs, 2 wavelength demultiplexer/multiplexer pairs, and 2 optical space switches. Seven lightpaths propagate through the
network, simultaneously. The detected disruption at node N7 stems from two different sources A1 and A2, carried along with lightpaths p2 and p7, respectively.
Lightpath p5, on which serious performance degradation is detected, is innocent and should not be disconnected. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Network management for AONs faces additional challenges 
such as performance monitoring and ensuring adequate QoS 
guarantees in the network. Performance management is 
germane to successful AON operation since it provides signal 
quality measurements at very low BERs and fault diagnostic 
support. In particular, signal quality monitoring is difficult in 
AONs as the analogue nature of optical signals means that 
miscellaneous transmission impairments aggregate and can 
impact the signal quality enough to reduce the QoS without 
precluding all network services. This results in the continuous 
monitoring and identification of the impairments becoming 
challenging in the event of transmission failures.  
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In this paper, we have discussed various management issues 
in AONs with particular emphasis on complications that arise 
from the unique characteristics and behaviors of AON 
components. A simple and reliable signal quality monitoring 
method does not exist at present. Therefore, the employment 
of additional approaches that rely on available mentoring 
methods is extremely useful for assessing the proper and 
secure functioning of AON components. Accordingly, we 
have presented an outline of our MALI algorithm, which can 
make a contribution to the fault management of AONs. The 
MALI algorithm offers the advantage of managing faults and 
attacks with less monitoring information than is required by 
other approaches. As a direct consequence, the algorithm 
reduces the cost and complexity of signal monitoring for 
future AON NMS solutions. 
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